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the World Economy: 
Introduction 
Martin  Feldstein 
Until the decade of the 1980s it was common for Americans to ignore 
the international role of our economy. Imports and exports accounted 
for less than  10 percent of our gross national product, trade was ap- 
proximately in balance, and international capital flows financed a very 
small portion of the net investment in the United States. In this en- 
vironment, government officials, businessmen, and academic econo- 
mists could safely think about the American economy with little at- 
tention to its international linkages. 
The events of  the  1980s changed all of that. The dollar rose more 
than  75 percent between  1980  and  1985, leading to a massive trade 
deficit and a correspondingly large capital inflow. By  1986, the trade 
deficit exceeded $170 billion or 4 percent of GNP and was inflicting 
substantial pain on those firms that exported to the rest of  the world 
or that competed with imports from abroad. In addition, the interna- 
tional debt crisis that began in  the fall of  1982 drew attention to the 
links between U.S. banks and the performance of foreign debtor na- 
tions. It was no longer possible to ignore the international environment 
within which the U.S. economy operated. 
The NBER conference presented in this volume was held in March 
1987. By then the dollar had been declining from its peak for two years 
and was back within 10 percent of its initial trade-weighted real value. 
There was, however, no clear evidence that the U.S. trade deficit had 
begun to shrink. Although the Commerce Department  had recently 
estimated a small decline in the real trade deficit in the final quarter of 
1986, the volume of  imports was still rising. Congress was debating 
new trade  legislation that would close American  markets to foreign 
products, and the finance ministers of the major industrial countries 
were discussing ways to stabilize the exchange rates. 
1 2  Martin Feldstein 
Despite the  very  slow adjustment of  the U.S.  trade  deficit, most 
economists believed that the reversal of  the dollar’s rise would soon 
cause a significant rise in exports and decline in imports. I and several 
others had predicted that the dollar would go on declining and would 
fall enough so that the United States would actually have a trade surplus 
by the early 1990s. This shift from massive trade deficit to trade surplus 
will occur because the world financial markets will not finance the flow 
of capital to the United  States that would be required if  the United 
States continued to have a trade deficit. 
More specifically, past experience implies that if the dollar remained 
at its level of early 1987, the U.S. trade deficit would shrink from $170 
billion to about $90 billion but would then stop declining. Financing 
that trade deficit would therefore require a capital inflow of $90 billion 
a year from the rest of the world. But in addition to this capital inflow, 
the United States would also require additional credit from the rest of 
the world  to finance the interest and dividends that  accrued on the 
foreign investments in the United States. By the end of  1986, the net 
foreign investment in the United States was $200 billion. That total was 
growing at an annual rate  of  $140  billion and could be expected to 
exceed $800 billion within five years. The interest and dividends on 
this amount would be about $60 billion. Thus the total capital inflow 
required by the early 1990s would be $150 billion a year and rising. 
Foreign investors are very unlikely to be willing to devote so much of 
their own saving to investments in U.S.  assets. Even if they are willing to 
go on lending the full amount of the interest and dividends that accrues 
each year, the United States would still have to export an amount equal 
to our imports, that is, to be in trade balance. Ifforeign investors want to 
provide less credit and get some net interest and dividend income on the 
funds that they have already provided, the United States will have to run 
atrade  surplus. Indeed, ashift to trade surplus must eventually begin since 
otherwise the United States will have enjoyed a monumental capital in- 
flow without evergivinganythingin return. (Foramorecomplete butnon- 
technical discussion, see Feldstein 1987.) 
The challenge to the United States is to achieve this rebalancing of 
trade without a reduction in net investment in the United States and 
without a recession. The current level of U.S. investment in plant and 
equipment and in housing has been sustained by the capital inflow from 
the rest of the world. As the trade deficit and the current account deficit 
shrink, the capital inflow from the rest of the world will also decline. 
Unless saving in the United States increases substantially, our domestic 
investment will inevitably fall. 
The key to increasing the national saving rate is to reduce the deficit 
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billion would absorb about half of  all the net  saving of  households, 
businesses, and state and local governments. If the capital inflow from 
the rest of the world declines without a corresponding fall in govern- 
ment borrowing, real interest rates in the United States would have to 
rise to induce a substantial enough fall in net investment in plant and 
equipment and in housing. The fact that real long-term interest rates 
are currently nearly twice their historic average reflects the market’s 
concern that this clash between the government’s borrowing needs and 
private investment demand will soon be exacerbated by a decline in 
the inflow of foreign capital. 
The requirement for avoiding a decline in domestic investment while 
the economy returns to a trade balance is easier to specify than it is 
to achieve politically. The goal of shrinking the budget deficit has been 
accepted by both political parties since the beginning of the decade, 
but they have not been able to find a consensus on the composition of 
the deficit reduction. 
The challenge of avoiding a recession while the United States returns 
to a trade balance is equally difficult, but the problem is technical as 
well as political because it is not clear what steps, if  any, need to be 
taken. The most obvious direct effect of the decline in the trade deficit 
is expansionary since exports rise and imports fall. But the decline in 
the trade deficit also brings with it contractionary side effects: the rise 
in interest rates and fall in investment, the decline in the fiscal stimulus 
if the budget deficit is reduced in order to limit the interest rate increase, 
and the fall in consumption that occurs because American households 
become poorer as the decline in the dollar reduces their purchasing 
power in  world markets and therefore reduces the real income that 
they have to spend at home. No one can know the relative speeds with 
which these positive and negative forces will affect overall demand and 
production in  the United  States. If  the direct effect on net  exports 
comes sooner and is stronger, a recession will automatically be avoided. 
But if the adverse effects on investment and consumption occur sooner, 
the economy could fall into a temporary recession. 
A monetary policy aimed at stabilizing nominal GNP might dampen 
these effects but could not be certain to prevent a recession. A more 
expansionary monetary policy could lead to rising inflation that would 
create even greater problems  in the future. And discretionary fiscal 
policies aimed at offsetting a potential but uncertain economic down- 
turn could actually exacerbate cyclical instability if the timing of their 
effects are inappropriate. The risk  of  an economic downturn in  the 
process of returning to a trade balance is the price that the American 
economy must pay for not dealing sooner with the fiscal imbalances 
that caused the trade deficit. 4  Martin Feldstein 
Changes Abroad 
The shift of the United States from a massive trade deficit to a trade 
surplus will bring substantial gains to many American firms and their 
employees. But the nature and magnitude of those gains will depend 
on developments in the rest of the world. Much of the conference dealt 
with the potential for such changes abroad. 
A central issue in this context is the extent to which foreign countries 
will give American firms greater access to their markets. Although the 
financial forces in world capital markets will eventually cause the dollar 
to decline by  enough to lead to a U.S.  trade surplus regardless of 
whether or not foreign markets are opened, the gains for both Amer- 
icans and foreigners will be greater if foreign markets are more open 
as this occurs. If foreign markets are open, U.S. firms will be able to 
produce those products and services in which we are relatively more 
efficient. This allows American workers and firms to benefit from doing 
more of what they do best and permits foreign buyers to take advantage 
of the relatively low cost of U.S. production. 
If  however  foreign markets are closed to an increased volume of 
American products, the shift from the current trade deficit to a trade 
surplus will be achieved by reducing imports into the United States. 
This reduction in imports could be obtained by either an even greater 
fall in  the dollar than would otherwise be  necessary  or by  explicit 
protectionist policies of quotas and tariffs. The fall in the dollar would 
be  the least  harmful of  these while  the  quotas  would be the most 
harmful. In either case, American firms and workers would lose the 
opportunity to sell more of  the products in which they have a com- 
parative advantage. Moreover, American consumers would be denied 
the opportunity to buy the foreign goods that they would have been 
able to purchase if foreigners were buying more of U.S. products. 
There is a clear risk that the falling dollar will lead the major trading 
partners of the United States to become more protectionist in order to 
avoid competition at home from American producers. This would not 
stop the shifting trade balance but it would hurt foreign consumers and 
foreign exporters and would encourage protectionist retaliation by the 
United States. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the problem of access to foreign 
markets came up repeatedly in the conference. Much of this discussion 
focused on the special problems of access to the markets of Japan and 
the newly industrialized countries of the Asian Pacific rim. There was 
also substantial attention to the problem of selling in Latin America 
now that the international debt situation has required those countries 
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Access to foreign markets involves access for the sale of  services 
and for investments as well as for the sale of goods. This point was 
emphasized in two of  the  sessions of  the conference and has been 
recognized in the new round of GATT negotiations. Access for services 
is more complex in many ways than access for goods since access for 
services generally involves being able to produce the service in the 
foreign country as well as to sell it there. Effective access means pro- 
viding the same “national”  treatment to foreign suppliers of a service 
as to domestic suppliers so that the two can compete equally. Because 
there are so many special features in the markets for services and in 
foreign investment, it appears that progress will be slow and will have 
to be made on a bilateral case-by-case basis as well as under the um- 
brella of an expanded multilateral GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade). 
Restricting the imports of goods and services and excluding foreign 
investment are not the only barriers to free international commerce. 
The other major problem discussed at the conference was the provision 
of  government subsidies to exports and to domestic producers.  This 
has been a problem in a number of industries but has been particularly 
acute in agriculture. 
The dramatic reduction of U.S.  agricultural exports in recent years 
can also be traced to technological changes abroad, to trends in foreign 
income and population, and to the introduction of effective production 
incentives in China, Latin America, and elsewhere. But the growing 
volume of  agricultural subsidies in Europe, Japan, and the United States 
is extremely wasteful. They cause a serious misallocation of productive 
resources to low-value activities, contribute significantly  to  government 
budget deficits, and raise the cost of food to European and Japanese 
consumers. 
Latin American Debtors 
The increased agricultural exports from Latin America have helped 
those’countries adjust to the drying up of new foreign capital after 1982. 
The sessions at the conference on Latin America and on the interna- 
tional debt problem emphasized the progress being made in those coun- 
tries as well as the seriousness of the current situation for both the 
debtors and the creditor institutions. 
The fundamental problem in achieving the successful management 
of the debt problem in the major middle-income debtor countries is 
achieving a cooperation between creditors and debtors that neither has 
a compelling incentive to offer. The debtors need to limit their debt 
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growth, while the creditors need to limit their exposure in  order to 
raise funds at a cost that  permits them  to compete in  world  credit 
markets. It is tempting, therefore, for each side to unilaterally abandon 
the effort at a cooperative solution. 
Fortunately, it is in principle possible to permit the debt to grow at 
a rate that is fast enough to support acceptable growth in the debtor 
countries while still shrinking the ratio of  the debt to the GNPs and 
exports of those countries and to the overall size of the banks’ capital 
and earnings. The problem is to convince both creditors and debtors 
that such a cooperative solution is more in their interest than a de facto 
unilateral repudiation of  debt by  the debtors or an unwillingness to 
provide any additional credit by the creditors. And as the conference 
presentations emphasized, any additional credit will be more effective 
if it is combined with reforms in the debtor countries that lead to higher 
growth and better resource use. 
Changing World Capital Markets 
The dramatic fluctuations in the relative value of the dollar and the 
unprecedented growth in the size of the U.S.  trade deficit captured the 
headlines in the 1980s. But the more fundamental and persistent changes 
in the world economy that happened during those years were the struc- 
tural innovations in international financial markets. New technologies 
and regulatory reforms have combined to create global financial mar- 
kets that did not exist a decade ago. The pace of change was accelerated 
when the sharp fluctuations in exchange rates and interest rates spurred 
the demand  for new  instruments  that  could  protect  investors from 
unwanted speculation. 
The new financial instruments and their  new uses have permitted 
individual investors to achieve a better allocation of credit and of risks 
around the world. But while protecting individual investors, they may 
also have increased the overall risks to the banking and financial sys- 
tems. Neither the banks and other financial institutions that use the 
new domestic and international instruments nor the government agen- 
cies that regulate those banks can be fully confident that they know 
the effects of the new instruments and new investment strategies. Only 
substantially  more  study and time  will  tell  the  significance of  their 
increasing role. 
The conference discussion highlighted some of the risks of the chang- 
ing financial marketplace and the impact of  international competition 
as a driving force in this change. Moreover, because American investors 
and borrowers can use foreign capital markets and foreign institutions 
that do business in the United States, the traditional bank regulations 
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weaken the American banking system. This is accelerating the dete- 
rioration of  the old role of banks and hastening their shift to the de- 
velopment of new and riskier products and services. 
In an integrated world capital market, regulatory provisions must be 
uniform across countries and competing institutions in order to avoid 
weakening those institutions and markets that are more tightly regu- 
lated. Some steps have already been taken by the Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of  England to coordinate bank capital requirements. Over 
time, this type of coordination of banking rules is likely to spread to 
other countries and other issues. Ultimately it may  become a principal 
that extends to other financial service industries. 
The impact of our integrated world capital markets may reach much 
further. If long-term capital comes to flow very freely among major 
industrial countries, it will no longer be possible to develop tax systems 
without taking such capital flows into account. A country with higher 
tax rates will drive away profitable businesses, while a country with 
generous investment allowances will attract more investments in plant 
and equipment. At the level of macroeconomic policy, the availability 
of  foreign capital postponed the rise in  U.S. interest rates and may 
therefore have given U.S. officials the political luxury of ignoring the 
deficit for a longer time  than would  otherwise have been  possible. 
Similarly, the current fall in the dollar and corresponding rise in interest 
rates may force political action to reduce the deficit sooner than would 
otherwise have happened. 
The falling dollar may also have an important impact on national se- 
curity decisions and American strategic policies. The substantial decline 
of the dollar makes it more expensive for the United States to maintain 
troops abroad, to provide foreign aid, and to do anything that requires 
purchasing goods and services in foreign markets. The government may 
respond to this higher price by cutting back on such overseas activities, 
changing the volume and nature of the American presence abroad. 
In the years ahead the role of the United States in the world economy 
is likely to change fundamentally as foreign companies play a larger 
direct role inside the American economy. The United States is of course 
fundamentally attractive to foreign investors because of its massive $5 
trillion market place, its political stability, its continuing flow of tech- 
nological and product innovations, and its relatively flexible labor and 
product markets. The recent tax changes increase the appeal of location 
in  the United  States to  businesses that  produce  substantial taxable 
profits or high professional incomes. The sharp decline in the dollar 
also  makes  American  assets more  attractive to foreign buyers  and 
lowers the relative cost of production in the United States. The next 
decade is therefore likely to see an increase in the volume and range 
of foreign businesses investing in American facilities. 8  Martin Feldstein 
The papers in this volume indicate the diversity of the ways in which 
the American economy influences and is influenced by economic events 
and  conditions around  the world. The experience of  the  1980s  has 
dramatically demonstrated the power and extent of  this interdepen- 
dence. American businessmen must become increasingly global in their 
activities and in their vision of the market environment within which 
they operate. Policy officials in the United States must recognize that 
the response of  the American economy to changes in American eco- 
nomic policies is very much influenced by the impact of  those policies 
on trade and capital flows. This conference and the resulting book will 
have been a success if they increase the awareness of corporate leaders, 
policymakers, and economic analysts to this changing role of the United 
States in the world economy. 
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